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THE PowER

OF

PRIVATE FAcTs

Anita L. Allen*

IF

AN ENGAGING style could serve as a palliative, Frederick

Schauer's

Reflections on the Value of Truth would have caused

his symposium commentators no trouble. 1 But, Erwin Chemerin
sky and Susan Gilles contend that Professor Schauer's substantive
arguments, however engaging, are "misguided, " "dangerous, " 2 "of
little help, " and "elitist. " 3 My reaction to Professor Schauer's as
sessment of first amendment values and the competing privacy
values recognized by tort law is different from the other commen
tators' reactions. I am substantially in accord with Schauer's main
points and will try to explain why below.
Professor Schauer begins by arguing against a conception of
the value of truth held by some first amendment theorists. 4 Ac
cording to Professor Schauer, the value of truth is not inherent
and categorical; it is contingent and instrumentaL5 A community
is not always better off knowing everything that might conceivably
be known about each of its members. 6 Professor Schauer con
cludes that not even the media best serve the community by pub
lishing facts about individuals simply because they are facts. He
suggests that courts are sometimes justified in holding defendants
liable in tort for injuries stemming from the publication of private
facts;7 tort compensation for invasion of privacy is justified where
the disclosure of private facts is "highly offensive," at least in
part, because of the particular allocation of power immunized dis
closure would represent.
Where do Professor Schauer's reflections leave venerated lib-

*

Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center.
Schauer, Reflections on the Value of Truth, 41 CASE W RES. L REv. 699 (1991).
2. Chemerinsky, In Defense of Truth, 41 CASE W. REs. L REv. 745, 745 (1991)
3. Gilles, All Truths Are Equal. But Some Truths are More Equal Than Others, 41
CASE W RES. L REV. 725, 729 (199 1).
4. Schauer, supra note I, at 699-704.
5. !d. at 704-07.
6. !d. at 708.
7. !d. at 717.
I.
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eral ideals of truth and truth-telling? They are largely left alone.
Viewing his overall argument schematically, it is apparent that
Professor Schauer's analysis does not denigrate truth. He argues
as follows:

(1)
(2)

Truth has instrumental, not intrinsic, value.8
Truth's

instrumental

value

is

contingent

rather

than

necessary.9

(3)

Acquiring truth usually has better consequences than ac

quiring falsehood.10
(4) Gains in knowledge-justified true belief-do not always
lead to aggregate utility, happiness, or welfare.11

(5)

Gains in knowledge may "come at the expense of someone

else's well-being or dignity."12
(6) Since gains in knowledge may come at someone's expense,
knowledge may be used as an instrument of power.13
(7) Those who know what is true or probably true about a per
son have a degree of power over that person.14
(8) The design of legal rules regulating the dissemination of
knowledge should include consideration of who will have that
knowledge, at whose expense that knowledge will be gained, and
what, if any, are the societal benefits or costs of that shift in
power.15

(9)

Privacy law regulates the dissemination of knowledge. In

rendering decisions in tort cases alleging wrongful publication of
private facts, courts should consider the class of individuals or
institutions likely to be empowered by victory or defeat.16

(1 0)

Media defendants in privacy actions alleging wrongful pub

lication of private facts should not prevail simply because they
are the media and have published what is true.17

The first two premises are logically consistent with the pro
position that truth is as valuable as the most valuable human
good. These assertions, therefore, do not entail a denigrated view
of truth. 1 8 The next five premises are essentially empirical claims

8.
9.
10.
II.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

!d. at 706.
!d. at 709.
/d. at 707.
!d. at 707-08.
!d. at 710-11.
Id. at713-14.
!d. at 714.
!d. at 717.
!d. at 722-24.
!d. at 724.
Schauer's opening premises comprise a serious philosophical position, seriously

759

RIGHT TO PRIVACY

1991]

borne out by ordinary experience. Concrete cases offer significant
support. 1 9 The last three premises do not follow inexorably as a
matter of logic alone from the first seven. They are normative rec
ommendations about the appropriate legal response to premises
one through seven. Professor Schauer openly admits that the cru
cial assertions contained in the last three premises would be re
jected by those who are antipathetic to either conjunct of his be
lief that "power relations among people and institutions are
necessarily implicated in the design of legal doctrine . . . and thus
ought

to
" 20

be

considered

explicitly

in

the

design

of

doctrine

The schematic presentation of his argument plainly reveals
that Professor Schauer rejects categorical equations of "the true "
with "the good. " 2 1 Yet, this presentation reveals that Professor
Schauer does not reject truth or its free expression. Moreover,
Professor Schauer does not send us sliding down a slippery slope
toward low esteem for knowledge. He does not argue that we
should habitually lie to one another to achieve private or public
gain, nor does he recommend a regime of government secrecy.
Professor Schauer does assert that the public might be better off if
it occasionally believed a falsehood. However, unlike Socrates in
Plato's

Republic, Professor Schauer does not propose that public

officials disseminate convenient falsehoods to gain citizen coopera
tion. 2 2 Professor Schauer does not urge that government adopt
"Big Brother " surveillance policies to constrain debate and limit
access to information. He does not propose that courts drastically
or intemperately broaden their role in the social definition of per
missible knowledge. Professors Chemerinsky and Gilles exagger
ate the adverse implications of Schauer's stand.
Professor Schauer's emphasis on knowledge and power rela
tions brings a refreshing realism to the discussion of privacy law.
Judicial ascription of privacy rights is an allocation of power.

de fended. However, I am not certain what, in principle, a conclusive defense of premises
one and two would look like.
19. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
20. Schauer, supra note I, at 718.
2 1. Compare PLATO. THE REPUBLIC 220 (F. Con ford trans. 1941) ("Both knowledge
and truth are to be regarded as like the Good, but to identify either with the Good is wrong
The Good must hold a yet higher place of honour.").
22. !d. at 106-07 (Socrates explains that rulers must propagate the fable that citi
zen's are by nature golden, silver, or bronze--and that only golden citizens may rule-for
the good o f the public) .

•
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Those who have license to say what they please about others with
out fear of criminal penalty or civil liability enjoy a brand of
power. It is appropriate that, when faced with the task of adjudi
cating privacy tort claims, courts consider the impact the rules
they fashion will have on the relative allocation of power among
affected parties.
Professor Schauer argues that "we should examine privacy
law by looking at the class of individuals or institutions empow
ered by an increase in information brought by a relaxation of the
current standard and at whose expense . . ..
" 2 3 Where the socie
tal and personal costs of telling what one knows are sufficiently
high and sufficiently discernable in advance, legal immunity is
problematic. The first amendment does not require blanket immu
nity for the media. Professor Schauer correctly concludes that the
media should not always win: the mere fact that the media is the
media and has published the truth should not automatically bar
actions for invasion of privacy premised on the publication of pri
vate facts. The reason that the media and other defendants should
not have legal immunity is that immunity gives them more rela
tive power than the Constitution requires or fairness permits.

Harris by Harris

v.

Easton Publishing Co./4 a case involving

the "private fact " tort, illustrates that revealing private facts can
be a harmful exercise of power.

Harris, like many other un

celebrated lower court cases, reflects the reality of power as a
source of, and remedy for, some categories of privacy-related inju
ries. 2 11 In

Harris, a Pennsylvania newspaper published by Easton

Publishing Company ("Easton ") ran a question-and-answer col
umn about eligibility for public welfare benefits. The paper fea
tured questions received and answered by the Pennsylvania De
partment of Public Welfare ("the Department "). 2 6 After Brigitte
Harris, the immigrant wife of an American serviceman, contacted
the Department with questions, it forwarded a slightly altered ver
sion of Harris's questions bearing the initials "J.S. " and a fiction
alized hometown to selected print media. 2 7

23. Schauer, supra note 1, at 718; see A ALLEN. UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR
WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY ( 1988); Allen & Mack, How Privacy Got Its Gender, I 0 N.
ILL L REV. 441 (1990).
24. 335 Pa. Super. 141, 483 A.2d 1377 ( 1984).
25. See, e.g., A ALLEN, supra note 23, at 123-52; Allen & Mack, supra note 23, at
457-65.
26. Harris, 335 Pa. Super. at 149, 483 A.2d at 138 1.
27. !d. at 149-5 1, 483 A.2d at 1381-82.
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In the Department's version, J.S. related that she recently
sought food stamps for herself, her pregnant teenaged daughter,
and her grandson.Harris also applied for food stamps for herself,
her pregnant teenaged daughter, and her grandchild.J.S. inquired
about medical care for her pregnant daughter.Harris had made
the same inquiry.J.S. said that the welfare office refused to pro
cess her application because she would not allow them to photo
copy her naturalization papers, which she believed could not be
copied lawfully.Harris had withdrawn her application because a
caseworker insisted on duplicating documents bearing a written
prohibition against photocopying.J.S. asked whether her eligibil
ity for food stamps would be affected by the income of a son who
lived at home and worked intermittently. Harris had raised the
same concern about her son.Easton chose to publish the questions
posed by J.S. without the initials and hometown provided by the
Department and without the Department's disclaimer that the
facts were fictionalized.2 8
Harris brought a lawsuit alleging invasion of privacy against
Easton, the Department, the Northampton County Board of Pub
lic Assistance, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Harris
maintained that seventeen people recognized her in the published
account.Harris's complaint against all public defendants was dis
missed with prejudice on the ground of governmental immunity.A
trial court subsequently granted Easton's motion for summary
judgment and Harris immediately appealed.2 9
The appellate court addressed the question of whether Harris
established a prima facie claim for invasion of privacy. The court
noted that Pennsylvania had adopted the

Restatement definition

of the tort of invasion of privacy.30 Harris alleged that the publi
cation of her inquiries invaded her privacy in two respects: the
unauthorized publication constituted an unreasonable "intrusion
upon seclusion"31 and unreasonable "publicity given to private
life.
"3 2 The absence of physical intrusion into a place where the

28.

!d. at 151, 483 A.2d at 1382.

29.

!d.

30.

/d.

31. /d. at !53, 483 A.2d at 1383. According to the Restatement "One who intention
ally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his pri
vate affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 6528 ( 1976), quoted in Harris, 335 Pa. Super. at !53, 483 A.2d at 1383.
32.

Harris, 335 Pa. Super. at !52, 483 A.2d at 1383. The Restatement states that:
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plaintiff had secluded herself or personal information led the court
to conclude that the first type of privacy invasion had not occurred
and thus to uphold that portion of the trial court's summary

judgment.
On the second claim, the court held that Harris's allegations
presented material questions of fact as to whether unreasonable
publicity was given to her circumstances.3 3 The court found suffi
cient evidence of publicity, even though it believed a stricter stan
dard applied in "private fact " privacy cases than in defamation
cases.34 The court stated that the privacy tort requires publication
not simply to a single person or newspaper but "to the public at
large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as
substantially certain to

become

one

of

public

knowledge."36

Stressing that at least seventeen persons identified the plaintiff
from the publication, the court also found that the publication
could be deemed to concern the plaintiff even though it did not
expressly name or picture her. 3 6
The court considered, but rejected, the trial court's conclu
sion that the "private facts " in the welfare column were not pri
vate by the time they reached Easton because the Department had
made them public by releasing them to the press. However, the
court noted that ultimate liability in the case would depend upon
whether the seventeen people who recognized the plaintiff learned
anything about her they had not already known. The seventeen
may have learned for the first time that Harris was poor enough
to be eligible for welfare, that her teenaged daughter was preg
nant, and that her son's employment was irregular. This publica
tion may have embarrassed Harris and damaged her reputation.
To buttress the contention that Easton's publication was un
reasonably offensive, the court relied on provisions of the Public

One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter pub
lished is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D ( 1976); Harris, 335 Pa. Super. at 154, 483
A.2d at 1384.
33. The court understood the central elements of the "private fact" tort to be: "(I)
publicity, given to (2) private facts, (3) which would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person and (4) is not of legitimate concern to the public.·· Harris, 335 Pa. Super. at 154,
483 A.2d at 1384 (citation omitted).
34. !d.
35.
36.

!d. at 155, 483 A.2d at 1384.
!d. at !58, 483 A.2d at 1386.

1991]

RIGHT TO PRIVACY

763

Welfare Code prescribing protection of information obtained in
the course of applications for public assistance. 37 Thus, while wel
fare recipients "do not have an

absolute right to keep private"38

all facts about their status, "applicants have a legitimate basis for
believing that the personal or confidential information revealed to
the Department as part of their applications for assistance will not
subsequently appear in their local newspaper for all to read." 3 9
The court understood that the Public Welfare Code did not at
tempt to define a duty of secrecy for third parties (like Easton).
The court relied on the Code solely to confirm Harris's contention
that certain disclosures of welfare information are unreasonable
and offensive.
The final element of the "private fact " privacy tort embodies
the common law newsworthiness privilege other courts have recog
nized.40 The private facts publicized by Easton were arguably of
public concern. Other members of the low income community
might have pregnant daughters, legal documents they fear copy
ing, and adult children living at home. The court cited the doubt
less "benefits inherent in the publication of information to aid
those eligible for public assistance who encounter difficulties in ap
plying for assistance or continuing " assistance.41 The court none
theless concluded that "there is

no legitimate public concern in

giving publicity to the actual circumstances of a person's applica
tion ...in . . . a way as to imply that those facts are true," and
the facts about Harris "were unnecessary to aid those interested
in receiving advice." 4 2
The

Harris case illustrates the relation between privacy and

power. Poor women with children are among the most powerless
groups in our society. State government and media concerns are
among the most powerful. As a condition of obtaining public as-

37. !d. at 158-59, 483 A.2d at 1386.
38. !d. at 159, 483 A.2d at 1386 (emphasis in original).
39. /d.
40. See, e.g., Cape Publications Inc. v. Bridges, 423 So. 2d 426 ( 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 893 (1983) (no invasion of privacy where photograph of nude crime victim is
newsworthy).
41. Harris, 335 Pa. Super. at 160, 483 A.2d at 1387 (emphasis in original).
42. !d. An analogous, and equally meritorious argument, has been made about the
publication of the identities of rape victims, an issue inconclusively addressed by the Su
preme Court of the United States in Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989), and Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 ( 197 5). Although the community should be
made aware of the incidence and location of violent crime, it is rarely necessary to reveal
the identity of the victim.
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sistance for her family, government authorities required Harris to
disclose intimate facts about her circumstances. Once she made
the required disclosures, her story was used without her express
consent for the benefit of others. Admittedly, entitlement to bene
fits is a kind of private power over public officials. A woman can
"compel " benefits simply by qualifying. As a practical matter,
however, bureaucrats, not individuals, control access to public as
sistance programs.
In appropriate cases, media tort liability can empower the
powerless through mechanisms of compensation, punishment, and
deterrence. In cases like

Harris, for example, a compensatory

damage award would enable plaintiffs to finance the material con
sequences of unwanted publicity. A damage award would also pe
nalize media defendants for recklessly disregarding the privacy in
terests of welfare recipients. From a public policy perspective,
imposing liability would deter the media from inflicting future in
jury under the guise of providing a "public service." Newspapers
might attempt to avoid liability by publishing such information
only when effective disclaimers and assurances of privacy protec
tion or consent have been given by the public assistance agency.
Increasing the costs of running a newspaper business to prohibi
tive levels through the threat of liability is not in anyone's interest.
However, encouraging the media and welfare officials to cooperate
in publishing public service information without needlessly impos
ing reputational and emotional burdens on vulnerable segments of
the community is very much in the interests of citizens like Bri
gitte Harris.
The trial court in

Harris had attempted to frame the case as

one about "the right of the press to publish information which it
has already acquired without solicitation."4 3 The appeals court
reasoned that there is no "unsolicited rnaterials " exception to the
invasion of privacy tort. The court also rejected Easton's claim
that the case was controlled by

Time, Inc.

v.

Hil/.44 There the

Court observed that the plaintiff, a former kidnap victim, was al
ready a public figure at the time of the allegedly tortious publica
tion. Harris was not. Also, the

Time

v.

Hill plaintiff had alleged

injury due to falsehood in a fictionalization of truth. Harris
claimed injury due to truth in a fictionalization of truth. The court
recognized that important constitutional issues raised by

43.
44.

335 Pa. Super. at 161, 483 A.2d at 1387.
385 U.S. 374 ( 1967).

Harris

1991]
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were not resolved by the Supreme Court in

Time

v.

Hill or its

other privacy-related first amendment cases.
Responding to the constitutional questions ultimately raised
by the case, the

Harris court stated that:

The right of privacy competes with the freedom of the
press as well as the interest of the public in the free dis
semination of news and information, and these permanent
public interests must be considered when placing the nec
essary limitations upon the right of privacy. . . . An ac
tion based on [the right to privacy] must not become a
vehicle for establishment of a judicial censorship of the
press. . . . However, on balancing the various interests, we
hold that [Easton] was not entitled to judgment as a mat
ter of law.4r.
A "balancing of interest " properly includes the interest of
poor mothers in empowerment vis-a-vis the more powerful institu
tions of state and press. The Pennsylvania Public Welfare Code
stands as evidence of the popular will and expectation that poor
women be so empowered. Where, as here, express statutory pri
vacy provisions do not reach media conduct, the court's common
law decision to reverse summary judgment is an effective check on
gratuitous inflictions of emotional. pain by the press. In reversing
summary judgment, the appellate court protected the interests of
a vulnerable community in a way that left first amendment guar
antees of free press intact.
I would add that Professor Schauer's assertion that the
ascription of privacy rights is the allocation of power is correct
whether one is speaking of privacy rights under federal or state
constitutions,4 6 the common law, 47 or statutes.48

It is correct

45. Harris, 335 Pa. Super. at 162, 483 A.2d at 1388 (citations omitted).
46. E.g., U.S. CaNsT. amend. IV. The relationship between power and privacy is
readily seen in the case of government intrusion of the sort the fourth amendment was
adopted to deter. When James Otis complained about British officials' "unreasonable"
searches of the American colonists' business papers, he was complaining about abuses of
power. See Paxton's Case, Quincy's Reports 51 (Mass. 1761).
47. See, e.g., Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance, 435 So. 2d 705 (Ala 1983) (sexual
harrassment in employment); Bodewig v. K-Mart, 54 Or. App. 480, 635 P 2d 657 ( 1981)
(employer strip search of employee in front of third party); Bennett v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94,
151 A.2d 476 ( 1959) (retailer's stop and search of customer in parking lot); Harris by
Harris v. Easton Publishing Co., 335 Pa. Super. 141, 483 A.2d 1377 ( 1984) (newspaper's
publication of private facts). Invasions of privacy have also been alleged by the more pow
erful party in a relationship. See, e.g., Barr v. Arco Chern. Corp., 529 F. Supp. 1277 (S.D.
Tex. 1982) (tape recording of alleged discriminatory termination by employee); N.O.C.,
Inc. v. Schaefe�. 197 N.J. Super. 249, 484 A.2d 729 ( 1984) (observation of illegal business

766

[Vol. 4 1:757

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

whether the "privacy" in question is freedom from interference
with autonomous decision making or freedom from highly offen
sive intrusion, disclosure of confidences, publication, or commer
cial appropriation. One who can invade or violate another's pri
vacy is a powerholder. Knowing

interference

with

another's

privacy is an exercise of power.
The law of privacy has no unique relationship to power. Even
within tort law, privacy claims are not unique in providing courts
with occasions for thinking hard about how legal rules influence
the allocation of power. The ascription of rights against battery,
assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprison
ment, and defamation are also allocations of power. If parents
were immune from liability for beating their children or corpora
tions for retaining managers who sexually harass secretaries, the
law would allocate powers of exploitation to families and firms.
Knowing this, courts weighing their decisions properly consider
power relations. Courts in worker harassment cases often ex
pressly consider the relative power of worker, supervisor, and em
ployer. The court easily appreciated that the plaintiff who sued for
infliction of emotional distress in

Ford v. Revlon49 was a victim of

raw power. Inside and outside of privacy law, the allocation and
reallocation of power is an important aspect of what courts do
when they decide cases.Sometimes they do it, and should do it,
explicitly.
CONCLUSION
Knowledge is power, Professor Schauer reminds us. Our soci
ety potentially keeps powerful knowledge away from potential
knowers by ascribing legal privacy rights. If gains in knowledge
were inherently good, all efforts to decrease knowledge would be
facially invalid, even those designed to protect the privacy of the
most vulnerable segments of society. Professor Schauer under
scores that some gains in knowledge are not worth the price. I
concur in his unwillingness to subscribe to an interpretation of the

activity by private citizen).
48. E.g., Rios v. Read, 73 F.R.D. 589 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (construing federal statute
to allow community group access to academic records over objections of school otticials and
individual students): Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 298 Or. 706, 696 P.2d 527 ( 1985)
(physician's disclosure of natural mother's identity in violation of confidentiality statute).
49. 153 Ariz. 38, 734 P.2d 580 ( 1987) (female plaintiff sued for infliction of emo
tional distress after male department head fondled her and repeatedly announced "I am
going to fuck you").
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first amendment that presumes gains in knowledge are always pos
itive contributions to the aggregate good. It is always important to
consider how truth arrives at the "marketplace of ideas," who will
purchase it, and, after the purchase, how many lives will be nour
ished by the knowledge it represents and to what extent of
fulfillment.

